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Abstract
We aim to identify the conditions under which social influence enables emergence of
a shared opinion orientation among members of an organization over time, when mem-
bership is subject to continuous but partial turnover. We study an intra-organizational
advice network that channels social influence over time, with a flow of joiners and
leavers at regular intervals. We have been particularly inspired by a study of the
Commercial Court of Paris, a judicial institution whose members are peer-elected
businesspeople and are partly replaced every year.
We develop an agent-based simulation of advice network evolution which incor-
porates a model of opinion dynamics based on a refinement of Deffuant’s “relative
agreement”, combining opinion with a measure of “uncertainty” or openness to so-
cial influence. We focus on the effects on opinion of three factors, namely criteria
for advisor selection, duration of membership in the organization, and new members’
uncertainty.
We show that criteria for interlocutor choice matter: a shared opinion is sustained
over time if members select colleagues at least as experienced as themselves. Conver-
gence of opinions appears in other configurations too, but the impact of initial opinion
fades in time. Duration has an impact to the extent that the longer the time spent
in the group, the stronger the possibility for convergence towards a common opin-
ion. Finally, higher uncertainty reinforces convergence while lower uncertainty leads
to coexistence of multiple opinions.
Keywords: social influence, advice networks, intra-organizational networks, opinion
dynamics, agent-based simulation.
1
1 Introduction
With this paper, we aim to identify the conditions that allow persistence of a shared
opinion orientation between members of an organization over time, under the assump-
tion that one fraction of membership is renewed at regular intervals. Such continuous,
but partial turnover characterizes many firms that renew part of their workforce every
year because some of their employees retire (or move to another job) and need to be
replaced by new recruits. It also applies to political councils, assemblies, or boards
where members have a fixed-term mandate and are nominated or elected at different
times, thereby generating flows of entry and exit of an equal number of members.
Sharing and transmission of “opinion” —a term that we take, very broadly, to des-
ignate any norm, value, representation, practice, or aspect of organizational culture
that might be subject to social influence — can be expected to take place extensively
as members interact with one another; agreed opinions, especially in reference to com-
mon activities, help members orient their behaviors. The opinions we focus on are
not those aspects of organizational culture and values that are formal, codified and
explicitly communicated to members; rather, we are interested in the possible emer-
gence of shared views through informal advice ties in cases in which formal structure
and rules leave some room for discretion. This possibility is all the more likely in the
case of knowledge-intensive organizations that thrive on innovation and are frequently
confronted with new challenges for which there is no established solution, so that only
advice-seeking and internal discussion may provide some guidance. It may also apply
to communities of practice, where heavy reliance on advice and information exchanges
accompanies limited formal structure. Be that as it may, over time and with changing
membership composition, persistence of a non-codified opinion in an organization de-
pends crucially on the (informal) process of social influence through which it is passed
on to new members; in principle, divergences and polarization around different views
may eventually appear.
Our reflection on this topic has been originally inspired by the real case of the Com-
mercial Court of Paris, a judicial institution in charge of a large proportion of business
litigation and bankruptcy cases in France, whose members are not career magistrates
but peer-elected businesspeople acting as unpaid volunteers, and are partly replaced
every year —with a turnover of about 10% (Lazega and Mounier, 2003; Falconi et al.,
2005; Rouchier et al., 2007; Rouchier and Tubaro, 2010). This organization is of
particular interest as it is an example of “joint regulation” of markets, integrating
representatives of the private sector with the public sector.
Exchanges of information and knowledge between judges are crucial to the life of
the Court, which thrives on its capacity to pool knowledge and expertise from mem-
bers’ diverse professional and educational backgrounds. Our previous paper (Rouchier
and Tubaro, 2010) focused on the dynamics of the advice networks through which
information circulates between them, and endeavored to reproduce an empirically
observed correlation between members’ approach to judging and tenure in the institu-
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tion: indeed those who have been members for a longer period of time tend to share
a more tolerant view of how to judge than juniors and newcomers. Two hypotheses
can be made to explain this observation: either individuals learn in time that being
tolerant is better to judge fairly or efficiently, or the influence of other members of
the group induces a change in point of view. The general organization of the Court
with its intense advice-seeking activity supports the latter hypothesis and makes it
particularly interesting to investigate: for this reason, we focused on it in our research.
We provided evidence that the hierarchy of the Court which distinguishes seniors and
those who hold formal responsibilities from juniors and low-status judges, shapes ad-
vice relationships and ultimately produces a shared “opinion”, or general orientation
on how to judge, which reproduces itself over time.
More precisely, the agent-based model with which we first studied this process ini-
tialized senior agents with a given, uniform opinion and let the system evolve over time
with entry and exit of an equal number of members at each step. We considered dif-
ferent criteria for advisor selection and studied their implications on opinion-sharing.
We found that despite heterogeneities at the moment of joining, in many cases few
time steps were enough for social influence to operate, so as to align all agents on the
same opinion. In addition under some conditions, this opinion was shown to remain
remarkably stable over time, persisting for many years after the departure of those
agents who initially held it (Rouchier and Tubaro, 2010). In this sense the agent-based
computer simulation in combination with fieldwork data, contributed to better under-
stand the social dynamics that generated these data. Though interesting in itself,
this result could not be generalized as it was, because of the complexity of the model:
indeed to ensure good fit with empirical data, we included constraints that reproduced
the particular structure of the Court, especially annual rotation of judges from one
Chamber to another and existence of hierarchy and formal roles such as Presidents of
Chambers.
The present paper sets out to investigate the conditions under which the persistence
of opinion observed at the Court can be found in a wider range of organizations or
bodies with regular flows of entry and exit of members. Specifically, we generalize our
work by relaxing the original constraints and removing hierarchical structure, rotation
rule, and formal roles. We thereby endeavor to account for organizations with changing
composition independently of their specific functioning rules and organizational chains.
The element we keep from the previous version is the communication structure, here
defined through criteria for advisor selection. We present here the resulting models:
several versions of the same structure with differing rules defining the possible forms
of interlocutor selection. Once basic properties are established, we also test the level
to which variations in the flow of entry and exit of members (or equivalently, changes
in the duration of membership in the organization) affect opinion transmission and
persistence. Finally, we explore the extent to which results are sensitive to newcomers’
openness to social influence. Our findings identify combinations of conditions under
which newcomers gradually come to adopt an opinion that they subsequently transmit
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to more junior agents through social influence, in a very general setting. Possible future
applications to real-world cases other than the Commercial Court include firms that
renew part of their workforce every year, political councils and other organizations with
membership turnover and also, tentatively, more informal groups such as discussion
forums on the Internet.
That these organizations and bodies may indeed exhibit similar properties in terms
of social influence and shared opinion formation, is due to the fact that flows of new-
comers and leavers contribute to differentiating the roles and positions of senior and
junior members, thereby establishing an implicit hierarchy related to tenure in the
group. This is a general property that is due to turnover only and holds indepen-
dently of the extent to which the hierarchy of the organization, if any, is based on
seniority. The sociological and organizational literature has highlighted that the so-
cialization process through which a new member acquires the knowledge necessary
to participate in collective activities is often mediated by interactions with more ex-
perienced members (Comer, 1991; Settoon and Adkins, 1997; Slaughter and Zickar,
2006). It is well acknowledged that advice from seniors to juniors may transmit not
only specialized information and knowledge but also agreed attitudes, beliefs and val-
ues (Hill and Carley, 2008; Morrison, 2002), to which members refer in their common
activities, both internally and in relation to external stakeholders (Pettigrew, 1979;
Schein, 1990; Martin, 1992). This literature, however, studies these processes mostly
empirically with emphasis on specific case studies, rather than with abstract, generally
applicable models as we intend to do in this work.
To ensure tractability together with generality, we adopt a deliberately simplified
representaition of opinion that leaves aside the multi-dimensionality of newcomers’
socialization, the relationship between formality and informality, the specific contents
that members discuss. We interpret opinion in the broad sense of a shared under-
standing on a matter that is relevant for the organization’s activities, and on which
members have some degree of discretion. We focus on how opinion can be transmit-
ted from existing members to new ones, so as to be sustained in the long run. This
definition stresses the potential durability of an opinion and its possible acceptance
by the whole membership, while allowing for minor variations at individual level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the agent-
based modeling literature that studies the apparition of conformity or, on the opposite,
of the definitive separation of opinions or cultures. The following section 3 presents
our research questions and hypotheses in detail. Subsequently, we describe our model,
tested with different types of internal network formation rules for agents. Section
4 illustrates the dynamics of the model and, with the help of a sensitivity analysis,
defines the limits within which the property of interest holds. In the final section, we
discuss our model by comparing it to the results of other researchers, and we conclude.
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2 Approaches to diffusion of opinion
Our work builds on previous results obtained with agent-based models of social in-
fluence and opinion dynamics. A milestone in this literature is an article by Robert
Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997). He adopts a broader approach with focus on culture rather
than opinion, and defines it generally as the set of individual attributes that are sub-
ject to social influence (“Culture is what social influence influences”); accordingly,
he adopts a multi-dimensional representation of culture as a string of features (di-
mensions) with a number of possible traits (values) in each feature. Initial traits are
attributed at random for each agent in a population. At each step, a randomly se-
lected agent will change one of its features by adopting the trait of a randomly chosen
neighbor, with a probability equal to their “cultural similarity”, i.e. the number of
shared traits; as a result, their similarity increases. On this basis, Axelrod shows that
separate “regions” (or areas within which all traits are equal) tend to emerge, in paral-
lel with a correlation among different traits that stabilize so as to form THE culture of
a whole region. Extensions of this model make the probability of interaction between
two neighbors dependent on factors other than similarity (Kennedy, 1998; Parisi et al.,
2003). These models have been mostly applied to problems involving large populations
of agents, for which a multi-faceted definition of culture is appropriate: for instance
social cleavages, ethnic segregation, and spread of languages.
Contrary to Axelrod’s approach, opinion dynamics models tend to represent social
influence as a scalar variable rather than a n-dimensional vector. There are two
broad families of one-dimensional models: those that represent the attribute that
is subject to influence as a binary variable (see e.g. (Galam et al., 1982; Galam
and Moscovici, 1991)), and those that allow for a continuous representation, with
two opposite positions and a continuous range of intermediate values between them
((Deffuant et al., 2001, 2002; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002)). The latter models
allow individual positions to vary smoothly between extremes; thus nuances can be
accounted for, and the modeler can define a notion of “distance” between two different
positions, measuring the extent to which they are close to each other but without
requiring them to be identical. These models have often been used to study the
conditions that allow emergence of extremisms rather than moderation in political
opinion.
Among the continuous models, the “relative agreement” model (Deffuant et al.,
2002) has been widely used in the agent-based literature since it was first proposed,
and a number of theoretical results have already been found and accumulated. A
detailed presentation of it is outside the scope of this paper, but its basic principles
are worth mentioning. The model is based on two continuous variables representing,
respectively, a value of opinion in the acceptable range, and a measure of “uncer-
tainty”, or openness to influence by others (which can also be interpreted as lack of
individual self-confidence). Each agent in a model is endowed with an opinion and
an uncertainty, and can be influenced by another only if their opinions are not too
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far apart, more precisely, if the distance between them is lower than the uncertainty,
which acts as a threshold. If there is influence, an agent changes both its opinion
and its uncertainty. The mechanism is relative in the sense that an agent will be
more strongly influenced if its partner is more self-confident/less uncertain than itself;
relativity makes the mechanism non-symmetric.
To ascertain the extent to which the social influence dynamics leads to consensus
or to formation of separate sub-groups with differing understandings, it is necessary
to identify clusters of individuals who share similar, though not necessarily identical,
views. A method outlined by Deffuant (Deffuant, 2006) consists in defining a minimum
distance between the opinions of two agents, below which they are said to belong to
the same cluster. The clusters are computed as sub-groups of agents such that between
any couple of agents in the sub-group, the distance is below the minimum. Within this
framework, emergence of one cluster corresponds to consensus of all agents around a
common view, while two or more clusters will indicate fragmentation into sub-groups
within which members tend to think alike, while divergences between sub-groups are
insurmountable. This method has the advantage of relying solely on endogenous
criteria for the definition of clusters, without requiring the modeller to arbitrarily
specify reference values of opinion.
For the purposes of our paper, it seems appropriate to refer to approaches that rep-
resent social influence on one dimension only. Indeed models derived from Axelrod’s
are little suited to represent relatively small groups and organizations as the Commer-
cial Court —which is composed of about 150 judges. In such cases, social influence is
more likely to concern a small number of features closely related to common activi-
ties, rather than culture in its multiple dimensions. Among one-dimensional models,
continuous representations are better suited to our case study than binary representa-
tions. Continuous models enable the researcher to detect, and account for, variations
and discrepancies in agents’ views even when they are small, and allow interpreting
social influence as a process that gradually unfolds over time. In particular, Deffuant’s
relative agreement approach is a most promising starting point for our research. By
making influence non-symmetric, it allows for an appropriate treatment of differences
that may arise in an organization with changing composition, particularly between
juniors and seniors.
Hence, our work remains close to the literature on opinion dynamics with con-
tinuous representations, inspired by Deffuant’s work. 1 The main difference is the
particular structure of the population we focus on, with fixed size but changing com-
position. Another difference is that we consider groups of relatively limited size rather
than entire populations, unlike most of the literature. Finally, our particular con-
text suggests the need to take into account the cognitive factors that likely inform
social influence in an organization, where opinion is transmitted as a result of com-
1This is the main reason why we adopt the term “opinion” which, despite having a possible interpre-
tation in reference to organizations, is less commonly found in the organizational literature than in the
political opinion-related works of Deffuant and followers.
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plex processes of knowledge-sharing and advice-seeking. Hence, we do not limit our
study to complete networks or fixed neighbourhoods, as is typically done in the agent-
based literature, but also consider logics of tie formation that reflect agents’ search for
knowledgeable interlocutors, in particular based on their experience in the institution,
their reputation among co-workers, and their similarity to themselves. To our knowl-
edge, no other study so far has attempted to model opinion transmission as a result
of advice ties formation in a network of this type, with entry and exit of members,
small-to-medium size, and knowledge-related forms of interaction.
3 Under which conditions is opinion sustained over
time?
We explore our model under three different dimensions to establish the properties that
enable an opinion to be transmitted over time. Each dimension in the model is related
to a different research question and hypothesis.
Network. The first dimension is the type of network formation logics that are
adopted by individuals when seeking advice, knowledge and information from others.
We partly explored this issue in our previous paper. Along the same lines, we test
here five different rules for choosing whom to interact with for our agents; they are all
inspired by our work on the Court but in principle, can be extended to any organiza-
tion. One criterion is to ask advice to those who are very central in the network, that
is, those to whom many people ask advice already, and hence can be said to have a
high “reputation”. Indeed with imperfect information, reputation can be taken as an
indicator of the competency of an advisor: the fact that an individual is consulted by
many others suggests that he or she presumably provides valuable insight, so that one
can infer a good degree of expertise. Another criterion is linked to the opinion that
individuals can perceive from others: they will ask only to those they know are quite
close to themselves. This method reflects a tendency towards homophilous choices, i.e.
to form ties to similar others, well documented in the sociological literature (McPher-
son et al., 2001). We focus on similarity of opinions but various other dimensions of
homophily have been investigated, for instance based on gender, education, or nation-
ality. A possible problem is that both the homophily and reputation criteria require
restrictive assumptions in terms of the amount of information about others that an
agent needs for decision-making. It is true that these assumptions are less unrealistic
in the context of a small or medium organization (such as the Parisian Court), and
that for reputation, we only require agents to know the most central among them, not
the whole network from top to bottom; yet it is worth considering alternative criteria
too. In particular, less constraining in this respect is the idea that individuals seek
advice from members who are no less experienced than they are, that is, those that
have been in the institution at least as long as themselves or even longer, assuming
that time spent in the institution increases knowledge and expertise. Eventually the
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least constraining way of making decisions is to randomly pick an advisor among other
members. The latter option may seem less relevant to study real-world organizational
life, but it is useful to take it as a benchmark, all the more so as it is used in most
of the theoretical, abstract literature on opinion dynamics; and it is a major intended
contribution of this paper to compare the existing findings of this literature with a
larger variety of selection rules. Finally, we also combine the homophily rule with the
experience rule because, as will be shown later (see 5.1), homophily is strictly speak-
ing not a rule in itself, but simply increases the number of interactions and drives
influence to reach 100%. It is in fact a random rule with a locally accelerating factor
that completely transforms the global results. 2
Duration. The second dimension can be seen as the core of our research. We
intend to ascertain the impact of duration of membership on cultural transmission.
Notice that with fixed size, duration of membership is perfectly equivalent to member-
ship renewal rate: indeed a low number of entries and exits at each step implies that
it takes relatively long before the initial population is entirely replaced, and members
remain in the group for a relatively long time; with the same group size, higher flows
of joiners and leavers imply a shorter duration of membership. In the latter case,
the process of social influence is likely to be less effective in harmonizing members’
view, and a shared opinion may not emerge, or not be stable. Accordingly, we aim to
identify the different cases and the conditions under which an agreed opinion persists
over time (see 5.2).
Uncertainty of newcomers. The third dimension is also dealt with in other
papers, like the seminal (Deffuant et al., 2002). We endeavor to assess the impact of
the value of what we call agents’ “uncertainty”, a variable that measures agents’ lack
of confidence in their own views and/or their willingness to be influenced by others.
Overall, lower levels of uncertainty presumably result in a smaller amount of influence
in the system, which in turn decreases the likelihood of a common opinion. Yet these
effects cannot be entirely predicted from start in the context we are interested in, with
a flow of incoming and outgoing agents; hence, a more precise analysis is desirable (see
5.3). Possible interpretations of this aspect are about the level of specificity of the
institution in which newcomers are integrated. For example in the Commercial Court,
judges are not professionals and may have very diverse ideas about legal disputes
when they join, so that presumably, they can be easily convinced of a new idea. It
may not be the same in other organizations, where newcomers’ experiences are closer
to their new roles. This parameter is thus institution-dependent, and cannot be fully
controlled, apart from the moment of selection of newcomers.
Accordingly, we test three hypotheses:
• H1: Criteria of advisor selection different from Random choice, will lead to
2In our previous paper, we also considered an “Authority” rule according to which members seek advice
from those higher up in the hierarchy. This rule is not included here because the authority structure is
organization-specific, and it would be difficult to identify a sufficiently general form that would hold for
many different organizations.
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different dynamics of opinion;
• H2: Longer duration of membership (or equivalently, lower turnover rate) is
favorable for social influence to occur, and improves convergence;
• H3: Higher uncertainty of newcomers favors social influence and improves con-
vergence.
4 Model
4.1 Agents and interactions
The model represents a fixed-size group of Agents, who leave after a certain length of
time and are replaced by newcomers. The flow of Agents is updated every time-step,
called a “year”. Agents can perform one type of action: to seek advice from another
Agent, and potentially be influenced by the other’s opinion. This communication takes
place ten times a year and follows a variation on the “relative agreement” model of
social influence developed by Deffuant (Deffuant et al., 2002). The attributes of an
Agent are hence:
• “age”: the number of years that the Agent already spent in the Group; when
the Agent spent less that half the maximum time it is considered as a Junior
and otherwise it is considered as a Senior Agent;
• “opinion”: a continuous value between 0 and 1;
• “uncertainty”: a continuous value between 0 and 1;
• “centrality”: defined as the number of other Agents that contacted the Agent in
question during the past year.
The influence model is as follows. Suppose an Agent i has opinion oi and un-
certainty ui, and communicates with an Agent j with opinion oj and uncertainty
uj . Their “opinion segments” are defined as the segments of length 2.uj (resp. 2.ui)
around xj (resp. xi). The possibility to be influenced depends on the distance be-
tween opinions oi and oj and on the uncertainty of the influencing Agent uj . If
there is influence, it is both in opinion and uncertainty, and it is proportional to the
overlap between the two Agents’ opinion segments (the agreement), divided by the
uncertainty of the influencer (expressing relativity in the sense that a more confident
advisor has stronger influence). In the standard relative agreement model, influence
can be reciprocal, whereas it is not in our model. 3
At each time-step the Agent has to choose an advisor, and four different functions
define this choice:
3This hypothesis reflects our vision of the organization as being split into two groups of different
seniority, which affects the possibility of being influenced, but it has to be noted that the results do not
differ much qualitatively when the standard relative agreement model is applied.
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• Experience: the Agent chooses among Agents that have been in the group for
at least the same time as itself, hence whose age is equal to, or higher than, its
own;
• Homophily-Experience: Among equally and more experienced Agents, the Agent
chooses one who can influence it (in the sense of the relative agreement model)
or has already influenced it in the past.
• Reputation: the Agent chooses among the 10% most central Agents of the group;
• Homophily: the Agent chooses among Agents that can influence it (in the sense
of the relative agreement model) or that have already done so;
• Random: the choice of an Agent is completely random in the group.
The underlying structure of the network within which Agents can contact other Agents
is what defines a choice.
4.2 Simulation and observed indicators
A simulation consists of a succession of time-steps. Initially, 200 Agents are created
in the group and are given an age, an opinion and an uncertainty. The choice of
the number of members of the group reflects our focus on small-to-medium sized
organizations in which the assumption that individuals have considerable information
about others and that in principle, they may access anyone else are relatively more
plausible. Considering the question we are addressing, the initial setting is such that
all Agents considered as Senior (with an age higher than half the maximum time) are
given an opinion near one extreme (here 0.2) whereas the opinion of Junior Agents
is randomly picked up between 0 and 1 following a uniform probability distribution.
Initial Senior Agents are also defined by an uncertainty, which is lower than, or at
most equal to, the one of initial Junior Agents. Once defined, Agents run a first
year: each of them chooses another Agent to communicate with by following the rule
that is used in the simulation, and then updates its opinion and uncertainty. After
ten interactions, the year is over, age is updated, and the centrality of all Agents is
computed. Agents who stayed long enough in the group leave; they are replaced by
new Junior Agents of age 0, characterized like initial Junior Agents. Table 1 gives the
parameters that define one simulation and the values we use for our experiments.
We take the parameter values used in our previous paper on the Commercial Court
of Paris as a benchmark because they have led to results that fit remarkably well with
the empirical data. In that case, membership turnover was 10%; the initial opinion
and uncertainty of Senior members were both set at 0.2, while the uncertainty of Ju-
niors was 0.7 and their initial opinions varied uniformly between 0 and 1. Consistently
with fieldwork observations, we interpreted low values of opinion as tolerance in inter-
pretation of the law, and low values of uncertainty as a form of self-confidence arising
from longer practice in the institution.
We observe several indicators in this model. The main one is based on the final
opinions of Senior Agents, those who have had enough time to be influenced by others.
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Table 1: Parameters and their values. Note that from membership duration, one can
deduce the percentage of Agents that leave and are replaced at each time-step.
Parameters Values
Criterion for advisor selection Experience, Homophily-
Experience, Homophily,
Reputation, Random
Group membership duration 2, 4, 8, 10, 20, 50
Uncertainty of Junior Agents 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
0.9, 1
We thus observe the average and the mean square deviation of Senior Agents’ opinion,
and the number of “groups of opinion”, or clusters, in which Senior Agents are situated
at the end of a simulation run.
The groups of opinion are defined in the same way as in Deffuant (Deffuant, 2006).
They are sets of Agents such that if one takes any two Agents in the group, either the
difference between their two opinions is lower than 0.05 or there exist Agents in the
group with intermediary opinions of distance less than 0.05. For example, if we have
5 Senior Agents of opinion 0.24, 0.28, 0.29, 0.32 and 0.34, one can consider that there
is one group, whereas if Agents have opinions 0.24, 0.28, 0.29, 0.35 and 0.38, there are
two groups. This proxy of observation is necessary to establish if, for a given average
opinion, it is possible to identify one, two or more opinions that characterize Senior
Agents.
We are interested in observing the properties of the system in the medium run
(about 5 times the maximum membership duration, or 5 “generations”), but we be-
lieve that it is also important to observe the long-run effect of the influence process
(50“generations”).
5 Results
5.1 A typical setting: impact of the criterion for advisor selec-
tion
Our first result is that in all our simulations, Agents who join the group are influenced
towards an opinion that they are not the only ones to share. Opinions can converge
to one value or several, but the influence process itself takes place with any set of
parameters. This result is in line with all the literature on the topic, though none of
the previous articles refers to groups with turnover. In our context as in theirs, simple
dyadic interactions lead to a macro convergence, which is in itself interesting. The
main parameter that affects the convergence process is the type of rule for choosing
advisors. How convergence takes place also differs widely depending on the type of
rule. In Figure 1, we show the final value of opinion of each Agent, as a function of
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its age. The data is captured after 50 time-steps in a simulation with 200 Agents who
stay for 10 time-steps in the group. The Agents we are interested in are the ones who
stayed in 6 to 10 years, that is, long enough to be influenced. In all cases, most Agents
converge towards one value of opinion.
Figure 1: Final opinion of each Agent as a function of age in the case of simulations with
200 Agents staying for 10 steps in the group, with initial opinion of Senior Agents of 0.2,
initial uncertainty of Senior Agents of 0.2 and uncertainty of Juniors of 0.7. The results
are given after 50 time-steps. It is clear that Agents who arrived recently are still very
squattered in opinion, whereas Senior Agents’ opinions are more structured.
Experience. What can be said at first sight is that the case of Agents who follow
the rule “ask to an equally or more experienced Agent”, whether or not in combination
with Homophily, allows alignment on the opinion which is closest to the one that was
given initially to Senior Agents. In fact the Experience and Homophily-Experience
rules do not allow initial Senior Agents to be influenced by Junior ones, while thank
to their large uncertainty, Juniors are highly influenceable, so that their opinions will
gradually tend to get closer to those of Seniors. The injection of newcomers at each
time step does not counter this process as they will themselves choose to contact those
who have been longer in the organization than themselves, so that they will also be
driven towards the same value of opinion. Their uncertainties (not represented here)
also tend to establish themselves at a level that is close to initial Senior uncertainty.
This result suggests that if experience matters as a proxy for knowledge, Agents who
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stay for a sufficiently long time in the organization are led to have the same opinion
as those who left it several generations before.
Reputation. Reputation yields convergence towards a value of opinion that in-
creases in time to reach the mid-point of the distribution. One reason for this result
is that this rule does not distinguish between Senior and Junior Agents at initializa-
tion; yet at each subsequent step, it gives a slight advantage to insiders relative to
newcomers as by definition, the latter enter with nil centrality. This is the reason
why the influence of initial value of opinion impacts a little longer than in the case of
Homophily and Random as will be seen just afterwards.
Homophily. It has been already mentioned that homophilous choice is not a very
strong criterion of selection of partners in our context (see 3). It is actually very close
to random choice, but includes a limitation to interactions where influence can take
place. Put differently, homophily appears to be mainly an accelerator of the process,
and still implies a totally random choice. It is for this reason that we study Homophily
in conjunction with Experience as well, as discussed above. Without Experience,
Homophily makes both Junior and Senior Agents subject to influence and allows even
newcomers to exert an influence, so that the effect of the initial opinion of Seniors
fades away over time, and opens the way to a mechanism of selection of interlocutors
that is close to randomness: indeed the high uncertainty of all newcomers and Juniors
makes the vast majority among them influenceable by virtually every other member
of the group. Our results show that with the same values of uncertainty and group
membership duration, there is convergence to a single value that tends to coincide
with the center of the distribution and does not depend on the initial opinion value of
Seniors. As in the case of randomness, uncertainty (not shown here) remains close to
the level attributed to initial Juniors and subsequent newcomers, around 0.7.
Random. As pure Homophily, the Random rule yields central convergence. This
result is consistent with what the literature shows to happen in a randomly formed
network with fixed composition, if all Agents start with the values of opinion and
uncertainty of our Juniors.
These first results suggest that initial opinion has an impact, and so does the way
of choosing who to communicate with. There is high stability in the results: from one
initial condition, the resulting dynamics are qualitatively identical.
Figure 2 provides the average value of opinion and uncertainty for Senior Agents
along a simulation that lasts for 500 time-steps (hence 50 generations of 10 time-
steps), so as to understand more precisely the dynamics that lead to the transmission
of opinion in our case. Both elements, opinion and uncertainty, are very interesting
to observe.
It appears that the choice to seek advice from a more experienced agent is the
one that eventually reproduces the initially shared opinion at best, not only in the
short run, but also in the very long run. It is also true when the Experience rule
is associated to the Homophily rule. In the two following subsections, we show that
this is generally true but also depends on the other parameters that describe our
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Figure 2: Evolution of opinion (red) and uncertainty (blue) of Senior Agents over 500
time-steps for each interaction rule. These images refer to one simulation; with the chosen
parameters, simulations are extremely stable and always display the same pattern of global
behavior. As in the previous figure, the simulations were run with 200 Agents staying for
10 time-steps, with initial opinion of Senior Agents of 0.2, initial uncertainty of Senior
Agents of 0.2 and uncertainty of Juniors of 0.7.
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organization, especially the impact of the length of time spent in it.
5.2 Effects of duration of membership (or turnover rate)
We study changes in membership duration only for one value of uncertainty, 0.7,
which is the one we also used in subsection 5.1. In the simulations presented here, the
number of generations is always the same, 5, a length that appears to be appropriate
to observe transmission processes in our system.
The idea behind this sensitivity check is to see if, for the same uncertainty and
number of generations, the maximum time spent in the group has an impact on the
possibility to transmit opinion to newcomers. As briefly mentioned in 3, a way of
thinking about membership duration is the renewal rate of the population. To stay
for 10 years, or time-steps (the value we first chose because it is the renewal rate of
the Paris Court, the real-world case we initially explored) means that 10% of agents
change at every step. To stay for 2 time-steps means that 50% of the population is
renewed at each time-step, for 4 time-steps - 25%, for 8 time-steps - 12,5%, for 20
time-steps - 5% and for 50 time-steps 2%. This parameter is in principle likely to have
a huge impact, and our results reveal that it also depends on the criterion with which
agents make their interaction choices. Simulations are conducted conditional to the
assumption that agents have the opportunity to communicate with others ten times
a year.
Three results hold for all types of simulations. First, the renewal of 25% or 50%
of the population (2 or 4 time steps spent in the group) does not enable the initial
opinion of initial Senior Agents to be transmitted to newcomers, and convergence
cannot take place (see table 2). Second, increasing duration always implies more
convergent opinions (with a smaller mean square deviation, MSD). Third, when time
spent in the group increases (above 20 steps) the Agents who join get influenced so
quickly that after four time-steps they all stay in a range of +/- 0.02 around the
convergence value4. The longer Agents stay, the quicker newcomers get influenced.
Apart from these three very general results, each model of interaction displays different
characteristics.
Table 2: The value of the MSD of Senior opinions for each type of simulation in case of
time durations of 2 and 4 (turnover rate of 50 and 25 %). The average opinion is always
close to 0.5.
Membership
duration
Experience Homophily Homo-
Expe
Reputation Random
MSD - 2 0.14 0.2 0.16 0.11 0.23
MSD - 4 0.03 0.01 0 0.02 0.03
4As will be seen, this result is slightly less strong for Experience simulations.
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Experience and Homophily-experience. For these two cases, the final opinion
of Senior agents decreases as group membership duration increases, and tends towards
0.2 (i.e. the value of initial Seniors) for almost all, as soon as 20 time-steps are spent
in the group. Even more striking is that Junior agents have an opinion that is very
close to 0.2 after just three time-steps spent in the group. Uncertainty is also quite
homogeneous and close to the initial uncertainty of Seniors, i.e. 0.2.
There is however a difference between these two cases. With Experience only,
longer durations enable some Senior Agents to keep a “high” opinion (neatly different
from 0.2) and enable Junior Agents coming in with a high opinion to keep it as well.
A subgroup of Agents whose opinion is initially around 0.9 increases it as time spent
in the group increases. This is one of the rare situations where, with high uncertainty
of Juniors, two groups of opinion can be observed. The high-opinion group is small,
including about 10 % of agents. Figure 3, table 3 and table 4 show the different results.
Inclusion of the homophilous feature in interaction, which is defined such as only
“useful” interactions take place (those that do lead to a change of opinion), actually
changes qualitative results in our system. When no homophilous selection takes place,
a Junior Agent coming in the system with an opinion higher than 0.95, most of its
interactions with more experienced Agents will lead to no influence. Indeed the vast
majority of more experienced Agents, those who arrived only 3 time-steps earlier up
until 50, have an opinion of 0.2. Only when this Junior meets Agents with opinion
higher than 0.9 will it be influenced, and thus stay with a high value of opinion. This
can explain that these Agents constitute a subgroup whose share is stable over time
and represents about 10% of Senior Agents at the end. To make sure this explanation
is right, we have run simulations with an uncertainty of Juniors of 0.7, and a turnover
of 2% and 5%, expecting the emergence of a subgroup of 19-20 Senior Agents. This
is the result we get on average, although the size of the subgroup can get up to 29
in some simulation runs. This can be explained by the fact that Agents with a high
opinion can also influence newcomers with intermediate values of opinion, increasing
their share. Once the proportion is established, it reproduces itself over time since the
probability to meet each type of more experienced Agent generates a probability to
be influenced, and hence attraction of a part of newcomers.
This situation is unlikely to arise in simulations where Agents interact only with
Agents that can influence them6, since they necessarily do get influenced as soon as
they join, and that can be either by high values or by intermediate values of opinions.
As soon as a newcomer is influenced by an intermediate value of opinion, its opinion
decreases and it becomes subject to influence by Agents with opinion 0.2, i.e. the vast
majority, so that its opinion goes quickly to 0.2. To force Agents to communicate with
others only when they can get influenced tends to homogenize the group rather than
segregate it, which is a pretty counterintuitive result 7
5Which represents on average 10% of newcomers with the uniform distribution we use.
6So unlikely we have not witnessed it in any Homophily-Experience simulations.
7This result also holds when comparing Homophily and Random simulations, to a much smaller extent.
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Figure 3: Opinions of Agents depending on age, when Agents stay 20 or 50 time steps
maximum. In all simulations, almost all Agents end up with an opinion of 0.2, even after
having been in the group for a relatively short time. In Experience simulations, a subgroup
with very high opinion is established in the long run.
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Table 3: For increasing maximum membership duration (and related turnover) in Expe-
rience simulations, the average values of opinion and uncertainty tend to 0.2. A group of
Agents with high opinion also appears with this increase.
Membership
duration
2 4 8 10 15 20 25 50
Average Opinion 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2
opinion MSD 0.14 0.03 0.002 0.01 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty 0.7 0.7 0.37 0.27 0.24 0.2 0.2 0.2
Nb of Agents
in high-opinion
group
0 0 0 0 7
(6.6%)
9
(9%)
6
(6%)
10
(10%)
Table 4: For increasing maximum membership duration (and related turnover) in
Homophily-Experience simulations, the average value of opinion and uncertainty tend
to 0.2.
Membership
duration
2 4 8 10 15 20 25 50
Average Opinion 0.49 0.49 0.31 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Opinion MSD 0.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty 0.7 0.67 0.34 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Reputation, Homophily and Random. These three types of simulations give
very similar results in the long run. The longer Agents stay in the group, the less
squattered their values of opinion, and most strikingly, convergence to a collective value
is visible at an early stage: after only 5 time-steps spent in the group, the opinion of all
Agents is at about the same level. The value to which opinions converge is somewhat
affected by the initial opinion of Senior Agents but this form of influence progressively
fades away, and disappears entirely after a few generations. In the long run, the system
tends towards the central value of 0.5 —as in our benchmark simulations with a 10%
turnover in the group. More precisely, the final value of opinion of Senior Agents
varies between 0.48 and 0.52, and is hence not completely stable with flows of entry
and exit; yet it can be considered as sufficiently stable when it comes to reproduction
of opinion. This fact takes approximately the same time to appear for Homophily
and Random simulations, but a much longer time for Reputation, meaning that the
latter rule preserves the initial shared value of opinion for longer. Finally, Homophily
simulations give values of opinion with a slightly higher MSD than Random ones, but
the difference is not significant. In Figure 4 it is possible to detect discrepancies among
average opinions in time.
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Figure 4: Average opinion of Senior Agents over 1000 time-steps. Choices of interaction
partners are based on the Reputation, Homophily, and Random rules. Time spent in the
group is 50 time-steps, which means that the turn-over is 2%. In this particular simulation,
and in all other simulations we ran, Reputation implies a convergence of opinion to 0.5
which is much slower than the other two.
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5.3 Effects of uncertainty
Figure 5 shows that the impact of differences in Junior Agents’ uncertainty depends
on the type of choice Agents make. This variation is in particular a way to attain
situations in which two or three opinions attract separate groups of agents. In this
case, the production of interesting phenomena is not only linked to what we already
know of the Experience criterion, but also the Homophily one.
Experience. When Junior Agents join the Group with the same (low) value of
uncertainty as Senior Agents, opinions remain very dispersed over time. Only when
there is an initial difference between Juniors and Seniors does some convergence occur.
Slightly increasing the uncertainty of newcomers produces two groups, one being quite
compact around the Senior opinion of 0.2 and the other, more dispersed, around a
value of opinion at a distance higher than the uncertainty of newcomers. Eventually,
the higher the uncertainty of Juniors, the less likely this second group is to appear
and when Junior uncertainty exceeds 0.8, we obtain a situation in which all Senior
Agents have a final opinion extremely close to 0.2.
Reputation and Random. Differences in Junior uncertainty have a similar
impact on Reputation and Random simulations, except that, as in all other cases,
the convergence of opinions generated by these criteria is a central convergence in the
long term. Situations where two groups co-exist are much rarer since the groups must
be separated by at least the value of initial uncertainty —otherwise one group is
ultimately absorbed by the other. As a result, there is no convergence when everyone
in the group has the same uncertainty of 0.2, there is polarisation around two different
opinions when the uncertainty of newcomers is 0.3, and there is convergence to one
opinion in all other cases. Generally speaking, the higher the uncertainty the faster the
convergence and the less dispersed the opinions. As in previous cases, the Reputation
criterion implies a convergence less dispersed than Random, and much slower to reach
the central opinion of 0.5.
Homophily and Homophily-Experience. For these settings, when the uncer-
tainty of newcomers is similar to that of Senior Agents there is convergence of opinions,
though not to a single value but to three different ones. It is the restriction of interac-
tions only to Agents that can exert an influence that leads to convergence to multiple
opinions. When uncertainty increases to 0.3, only two groups of opinion form (with
a difference of opinion that is higher than 0.3, as in preceding cases). As the uncer-
tainty of newcomers rises further, the two cases behave differently: with Homophily,
central convergence appears and no second group can be created with a difference of
uncertainty that is too large (0.4). From this value until 0.9, the impact of increases in
initial Junior uncertainty is just to slightly improve convergence, reducing the MSD.
In contrast, the Homophily-Experience criterion enables to keep two groups until the
value of uncertainty is very large; above 0.7 there is only one opinion for all Agents,
and group behavior is very close to the Experience situation.
It is interesting to note that it was possible to anticipate the impact of the 0.2
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uncertainty level for newcomers, since it is very similar to what is witnessed in the case
of a stable population (with no entry and exit of members) as in the original Deffuant
model (Deffuant et al., 2002). The reason why here, it appears only with Homophily
is that our model does not leave time to Agents to interact enough to achieve the
predicted convergence, unless there is an accelerating factor - the Homophilous choice
which as already mentioned, raises the number of influencing interactions.
Figure 5: Opinions after 50 simulation runs, for Agents who are allowed to stay in the group
for 10 years. The uncertainty of newcomers is 0.4. The combination of Homophily and
Experience enables conservation of the initial Senior opinion together with an alternative,
the two being far apart from each other. With Experience only, opinions remain dispersed.
Homophily and Random yield central convergence, albeit slowly.
5.4 Summary of cases
The three factors we have observed, namely rule for selecting advisors, duration of
membership (and related turnover rate), and initial uncertainty of newcomers, indeed
have a huge impact on the system. Only for certain values of parameters can a given
opinion be transmitted to joiners, and some of the interaction choice criteria do not
enable any conservation of opinion. Two types of behaviour can be observed, those
created with parameters that define hardly relevant limit cases, and those that match
our goals at least to some extent. In particular, two types of dynamics are of little
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interest:
• No convergence at all.
• Very light convergence in time: opinions are centered around 0.5 with minimum
and maximum close to 0.5, but variation among agents is always large. This case
arises with parameter values that can be considered as limit cases, that is, when
membership duration is low (less than 4), and/or turnover rate is high (more
than 25%).
There is another set of situations, much more interesting for our purposes, which are
usually generated with values of parameters that are similar to those that fit with our
case study, with a definition of Junior Agents and a turnover rate that are intuitively
close to what is commonly found in real-world organisations.
• All agents constitute one group of opinion around 0.5 - which means that there
is convergence to one value without any historical impact of the initial value of
the opinion of Seniors.
• All agents constitute one group of opinion that is significantly lower than 0.5 -
which means that the initial value of the opinion of Seniors has an impact in the
long run, although such an impact slightly decreases over time.
• Two groups (or more depending on the uncertainty of newcomers) co-exist and
newcomers can be driven towards the one or the other depending on their initial
opinion. In this case, one group is clearly linked to the initial opinion of Seniors
and the other group is far enough so as not to be absorbed by the former.
One important fact to note in our system is that there is no unique way to attain
a certain equilibrium. This might be considered as a problem by those modelers
who aim to provide a unique solution or path to reach a given goal. For us on the
contrary, it is evidence that the system we have designed can be controlled through
various parameters, or even that an observed situation can find several competing
explanations. This is not incoherent with the definition of “complex system” per se.
To summarize in terms of choice criteria, we can take Random as our reference,
where the network underlying interactions is the complete network. Referring to the
Random criterion has the advantage of allowing for comparison with results already
obtained in the agent-based literature. In our particular system, the Random case
generates situations in which all final values of opinion (for Senior Agents of the
group) are very close to 0.5 after a few generations. A common opinion hence exists
in the group but it is not influenced by the initial value of Seniors. Based on that, the
other criteria can be assessed comparatively:
• The tendency of the Reputation rule is to make the group around 0.5 more
compact than Random and to allow for the value of opinion being affected by
the initial Senior value for much longer than Random.
• The tendency of the Homophily rule is to make the group around 0.5 more
dispersed than Random but with a speed of convergence that is almost equal
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to it in all situations ; Homophily-Experience also makes values slightly more
dispersed than Experience, but with similar timing of convergence.
• The tendency of the Experience rule is to influence newcomers in the long run,
having all opinions lower than 0.5, that is, closer to initial Senior value.
We can thus conclude that H1 is broadly confirmed. Regarding the other dimensions
it can be said that overall, longer membership duration improves convergence and
allows for greater impact of the initial opinion; higher uncertainty of Junior Agents
also increases convergence and reproduction of the initial opinion. Hence, H2 and H3
are also confirmed.
It has to be noted that we have not tested the sensitivity of our model to the
number of interactions the Agents experience at every step (always equal to 10). This
is another variable an organization can control in principle. Devising incentives to
reduce the number of interactions could be hard, but increasing it, for instance with
formal meetings, may be easier. We aim to deal with these elements in an extension
of the present model.
6 Discussion - Conclusion
While remaining highly abstract, our research benefits from joint use of agent-based
simulation and fieldwork data, and innovates with respect to existing models of opinion
dynamics. It takes into account a more realistic setting, specifically adapted to orga-
nizations with regularly changing composition and intense internal communication or
advice-seeking. Our study, originally inspired by data on the Commercial Court of
Paris, is also suited to describe firms, political councils, communities of practice, and
other bodies.
Within this framework, we have provided evidence that ceteris paribus, reliance of
members on more experienced colleagues as advisors is essential to ensure transmission
and persistence of a shared opinion. This finding does not lead to advocate strict
hierarchical rules that give prominence to senior members relative to junior ones:
indeed for it to obtain, it suffices that members seek advice from those who are no less
senior than they are themselves, a category that also includes same-seniority peers.
Our work also shows that seniority in itself —and reliance on it as a criterion
to select advisors— does not automatically lead to preservation of opinion. Indeed,
this result also depends on new members’ willingness to absorb the organization’s
orientation as they join, and on the length of time they are given to understand
it in depth and to transform their views accordingly. Without these conditions, the
“wisdom” of seniors may not be sustained over time; in particular, it may end up as one
of various alternatives, which will coexist and will be available for future newcomers to
choose from. Hence, a hierarchical structure valuing seniority does not per se produce
transmission of shared understandings.
Another way to see our results is that each of the three dimensions investigated
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here —advisor selection criterion, membership duration (turnover rate), and openness
to influence by others— is a factor upon which an organization may choose to act.
Of course, each dimension gives rise to differing dynamics; yet they all play a role
in bringing about preservation of shared orientations, and all offer some scope for
intervention. In this sense, our work can be of interest for any organization wishing
to preserve its shared values —or to change them.
Future extensions of our work may concern the broader issue of organizational
culture, taking into account the distinction between codified and non-codified values,
beliefs, and representations, and the multiplicity of aspects and meanings that pertain
to culture. In particular one possible technical evolution of the model would be to
redefine opinion over two dimensions, allowing the opinions of two interacting agents
to be close along one dimension and distant on the other. Depending on the case
under study, homophily on one dimension could have a positive influence or on the
opposite, being far away on one opinion could reduce the possibilty to get influenced.
Whatever the correlation between the two dimensions, one can expect new dynamics
to emerge. Other research may explore cases in which the flow of entry and exit of
members is not given exogenously but depends on participation in collective activities
and/or on exchanges of information and advice; communications networks on the web
are a case in point.
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